Ben Turay v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-17-2020 
Ben Turay v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Ben Turay v. Attorney General United States" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 160. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/160 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 19-2347 
________________ 
 
BEN TURAY, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of  
a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A045-234-090) 
Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2020 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2020) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
                                                          
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Ben Turay, a lawful permanent resident charged with removability due to a 
controlled substance conviction,1 petitions for review of a final administrative order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his application for cancellation of removal 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  We will deny the petition.    
Discussion2 
 On appeal, Turay raises a single argument: that his procedural due process rights 
were violated when his 15-year-old daughter was not able to give live testimony at his 
merits hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) due to prison rules barring her from the 
building.  To prevail on procedural due process claims arising from removal proceedings, 
a petitioner must show “substantial prejudice,” meaning that “the infraction has the 
potential for affecting the outcome of the deportation proceedings.”  Serrano-Alberto v. 
Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Turay makes two arguments in support of substantial prejudice but, 
even assuming a due process violation occurred, neither meets that standard. 
First, Turay argues that his daughter’s live testimony “had much to add to his case” 
and that she would have testified about “the relationship she had with her father and the 
                                                          
1 Turay conceded the legal and factual basis for his removability below and does 
not challenge his removability in this appeal. 
 
2 We lack “jurisdiction to review the denial of discretionary relief, including 
cancellation of removal.” Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  “We 
may, however, review ‘constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for 
review.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).  We review the BIA’s decisions of law 
de novo.  Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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hardship she would suffer if he was removed.”  Pet.’s Br. 27, 28–29.  But the daughter’s 
written statement did discuss her relationship with her father and the hardship she would 
suffer if he was removed:  It discussed her father’s role in her life, her desire to keep him 
home, and the concrete ways he took care of her and her family and looked out for their 
safety.  And Turay does not suggest any specific material evidence that his daughter’s live 
testimony would have added to the record.  This lack of specificity about what, precisely, 
her testimony would have added dooms his prejudice argument.  Cf. Singh v. Gonzales, 
432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no prejudice resulted from petitioner’s alleged 
inability to call all the witnesses he desired because he did not explain the legal significance 
of their potential testimony).    
Second, Turay contends that live testimony is so materially different from written 
testimony that its preclusion necessarily causes substantial prejudice.  That argument, 
however, is one we have previously rejected.  See Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 175, 
185–86 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no prejudice where petitioner was “permitted to submit 
affidavits from the witnesses the court did not allow him to call”).  And even if live 
testimony could have affected the decision of the IJ, in this case, Turay prevailed before 
the IJ and ascribes error in this appeal to the BIA.  Yet Turay makes no argument as to why 
the BIA—who would not have the benefit of seeing and hearing Turay’s daughter but 
would merely read a transcript of her testimony—might reach a different decision from its 
review of that transcript than it would from reviewing her affidavit.  In sum, Turay’s second 
argument also fails to establish substantial prejudice.   
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Turay’s petition for review. 
 
